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Abstract
The implementation of policies to control nonpoint pollution is a complicated task because the lack of information 
about the biophysical processes and the asymmetric information between social planner and polluters. The objective 
of this paper is to evaluate the efficiency of using an input tax instrument (water tax) with a non-uniform tax rate to 
abate nonpoint pollution. This water tax instrument generates a reduction in the pollution level, and induces farmers 
to adopt abatement practices such as better irrigation technology systems. The model presents theoretically and em-
pirically the salinity pollution problems in the Ebro Basin (Northeast of Spain). Farmers are heterogeneous in crop 
types, irrigation technologies, and biophysical field characteristics. Because of this heterogeneity each farmer generates 
a different level of emissions, so farmers should be taxed differently. In this analysis, the social planner implements 
two tax rates according with farmers’ irrigation technology. Using a non-uniform tax rate, pollution emissions are 
reduced and farmers are induced to change their irrigation technology towards a more efficient one. The use of a more 
efficient irrigation technology increases social welfare and generates a cutback in the emission loads.
Additional key words: bioeconomic model; heterogeneous farmers; irrigation-based water tax; salinity; water pol-
lution.
Resumen
Impuesto Piguviano para incentivar un cambio tecnológico y controlar la contaminación difusa en la Cuenca 
del Ebro, España
La contaminación difusa de origen agrario se caracteriza generalmente por la escasez de información sobre los 
procesos biofísicos que la generan y por un problema de información asimétrica entre regulador y agricultores. Estas 
características hacen que el diseño de las políticas de control sea especialmente difícil, ya que el regulador no dispone 
de suficiente información para utilizar los instrumentos más eficientes. El objetivo de este artículo es evaluar la efi-
ciencia de un instrumento no uniforme sobre el input contaminante. Este instrumento basado en impuestos sobre el 
input genera una reducción en el nivel de contaminación, a la vez que incentiva al agricultor a adoptar tecnologías que 
reduzcan las emisiones, como son los sistemas de riego por aspersión. El modelo analiza teórica y empíricamente los 
problemas de contaminación por sales existentes en una región de la cuenca del Ebro. Los agricultores de la zona son 
heterogéneos en el uso de tecnologías de riego, tipo de cultivos y en las características biofísicas de sus parcelas. En 
consecuencia, cada agricultor genera un nivel distinto de emisiones y por tanto cada uno debería ser gravado con un 
impuesto diferente. En este análisis, el regulador introduce dos tipos de impuestos en función de la tecnología de riego 
utilizada. La ventaja de este instrumento es una reducción en las emisiones además de incentivar el cambio hacia una 
tecnología de riego más eficiente, que permita un menor uso de input contaminante. El cambio de esta tecnología in-
crementa el bienestar social y genera una reducción importante de la carga de emisiones de sales.
Palabras clave adicionales: agentes heterogéneos; contaminación de los recursos hídricos; impuesto sobre el agua; 
modelo bioeconómico; salinidad.
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Introduction
One of the main problems related with the control 
of agricultural pollution is the choice of the best policy 
to reduce the level of emissions. A common type of 
agricultural pollution is nonpoint pollution. It occurs 
when the point from which the pollution is emitted is 
unidentifiable, so typical characteristics of this class of 
pollution are the difficulty in identifying who is causing 
the emissions, the amount of pollution loads, and the 
location from which these emissions have been dis-
charged. The lack of knowledge and randomness in 
biophysical processes, and also the existence of asym-
metric information between regulators and polluters, 
impose important difficulties in regulating nonpoint 
pollution.
There are a large number of policy instruments avail-
able to control agricultural pollution, and the choice 
between them depends on the type and characteristics 
of the problem at hand. Pioneer studies about nonpoint 
pollution are the studies by Griffin and Bromley (1982), 
Shortle and Dunn (1986), and Segerson (1988). The 
first two studies focus on the use of input-based instru-
ments to control nonpoint pollution. The input that 
originates the emissions is taxed, so the use of this 
input decrease and farmers compensate society. Seg-
erson (1988) focuses on the use of ambient-based in-
struments. However, a difficulty of the Segerson’s 
approach is that in most cases the regulator does not 
have enough information about the pollution that each 
agent is emitting of nonpoint pollution. As a conse-
quence, the implementation of an ambient tax is quite 
difficult, so the alternative is the use of input tax poli-
cies. One characteristic of agricultural pollution is the 
presence of different dimensions that require the im-
plementation of diverse instruments. Following Ben-
near and Stavins (2007), the use of multiple policy 
instruments can be justified in such a second-best 
world.
Saline emissions are a type of nonpoint pollution 
from agriculture. The use of saline water in irrigation 
areas, or the use of saline soils in agricultural produc-
tion, generates a leaching and runoff of saline miner-
als into water bodies that degrade water quality. When 
salinity is present in irrigation water, salts accumulate 
in the root zone of the plants and affects negatively 
crop productivity. The problem of salinity is an im-
Abbreviations used: CIRCE (Centro de Investigación de Recursos y Consumos Energéticos); ECe (electric conductivity); EPIC 
(Environment Policy Integrated Climate); GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System)
portant issue in irrigated agriculture worldwide;  the 
irrigated acreage degraded by salinity problems 
reaches 80 million hectares, which is 30% of all irri-
gated land in the world. In Spain the acreage affected 
by salinity is around one million hectares, of which 
312,000 ha are located in the Ebro Valley (Alberto et 
al., 1986). 
This study analyzes the efficiency of a water tax 
policy to abate salinity emissions loads from agriculture 
in the Ebro Valley. A group of heterogeneous agents 
produce several crops on different soils and using dif-
ferent irrigation technologies. The soils are categorized 
as saline, moderate saline, and non saline. Because 
farmers’ irrigation, saline and moderate saline soils 
generate an important leaching of salts that goes into 
the rivers and other plots causing damages to ecosys-
tems. In the case of the Ebro Basin, large quantities of 
dissolved salt enter annually into the Ebro River. The 
origin of these saline substances is surface leaching 
from the geologic formations of the basin. The aug-
mented salinity of the river is affecting several ecosys-
tems and can cause major damages to downstream 
users.
In this work, a water tax is suggested to reduce saline 
emissions from irrigation agriculture in the Flumen 
Basin (sub-basin of the Ebro Basin). Farmers in this 
area mainly use two irrigation technologies, flood and 
sprinkler. Sprinkler is more efficient that flood because 
it uses less water to produce the same output, so both 
water returns and salt emissions are smaller. Social 
planner can identify the irrigation technology of each 
farmer, and then different tax rates by irrigation technol-
ogy can be implemented. Farmers using a more efficient 
irrigation technology should pay a smaller tax than 
farmers using a less efficient technology. The results of 
the model highlight how the implementation of an irri-
gation-based tax rate generates an increase in social 
welfare. With this tax instrument, the social planner 
limits the level of saline emissions to the Ebro River. 
Besides, it is also an incentive for farmers to change 
their irrigation technology to a more efficient one.
Methodology
Different policies can be applied to control nonpoint 
pollution. Ambient-based instruments are charges or 
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subsidies based on the pollution of the water bodies. 
This kind of instrument is more efficient because the 
tax is on the emissions that arrive at the water media 
and cause the direct damages. In this line Segerson 
(1988) proposed a tax-subsidy instrument that fixes an 
environmental standard, and penalizes farmers when 
they emit over the standard or subsidizes farmers when 
they emit below the standard. This standard is measured 
in water bodies. The penalization or compensation de-
pends on the total level of emissions in the water bodies 
for the whole group of farmers, since it is impossible 
to know the individual contribution of each one.
The problem with these policies is to obtain informa-
tion about the transport and fate processes of salt loads 
between farmers’ plots (source pollution) and water 
bodies (ambient pollution). The impact of a contami-
nant substance on ecosystems depends on several fac-
tors as the geology of the region, type of substance, 
climatic factors, etc. This information is rarely avail-
able in real world situations, so the implementation of 
ambient taxes is normally unfeasible.
An ambient-based instrument could be efficient in 
the salinity control problem, but would require the 
precise measurement of the quantity of saline materials 
that reach the river. It would also be necessary to iden-
tify the different impacts of each farmer’s emissions, 
because their soil characteristics vary. Therefore, the 
social planner needs to know the soil characteristics of 
all farmers, which is unfeasible in practice at a reason-
able cost.
Following the approach proposed by Griffin and 
Bromley (1982), if policy-makers want to implement 
a regulation to control nonpoint pollution, they need to 
take into account the biophysical information about the 
production alternatives and the emissions. These au-
thors proposed the implementation of an input tax to 
control nonpoint pollution in a multiple farmer model. 
These authors establish that the regulator has informa-
tion about the farmers’ profit function and can estimate 
the emission function. Under the assumptions of no 
transaction costs and perfect information about the 
farmers’ technology and runoff function, Griffin and 
Bromley show that an input tax is an efficient policy 
instrument to control nonpoint pollution1.
The model begins with the private maximization 
problem. Farmers maximize the benefits obtained from 
crop production less the fix and variable costs. In the 
absence of regulation farmers choose the input vector 
x to maximize their private net benefit function. This 
model has a unique productive input, which is the ir-
rigation water that farmers use. In this case, farmers 
are not taking into account the negative externality that 
their activity generates, and their choice problem is:
 Max x p f x p x Fci c ci x c Π ( ) ( )= ⋅ − ⋅ −  [1]
This formulation represents the maximization of the 
private benefit of the different farmers, where pc is the 
output price, fci (x) is the production function that is 
different by each farmer and depends on the choice of 
input x, the variable cost is px ? x, and Fc are the fixed 
costs of production that depend on the type of crop. 
The index c shows the type of crop (alfalfa, corn, or 
wheat), and the index i shows the type of irrigation 
system technology (flood or sprinkler). 
The emission and production functions are different 
for each farmer due to different characteristics of soil, 
crop, and technology. The model assumes that farmers 
are risk-neutral and all the prices are exogenous vari-
ables determined by the market. This model also as-
sumes that the regulator can observe the type of crop 
and the irrigation technology of each farmer, but cannot 
identify the soil type.
The first order condition of the private problem de-
scribes the farmer’s choice of production activities. 
This expression represents the typical economic rule 
where marginal benefits equal marginal costs. In this 
case, farmers ignore the negative externality caused by 
their activity:
 Π ' 'ci c ci xp f p= ⋅ − = 0 [2]
Environmental damage costs are the alteration in the 
ecosystems caused by the leaching and runoff of harm-
ful substances from lands into the water bodies. The 
damage function D 5 D(r) is an increasing function of 
leaching (D'(r) . 0). The nonpoint pollution emission 
is a deterministic function of the polluting input, ris(x). 
The index s shows the type of soil of each farmer. 
Therefore, leaching function depends on the irrigation 
and soil type. The damage function is linear and can be 
expressed as D[ris(x)] 5 d ? ris (x), where d is the eco-
nomic value of the emissions. It is assumed that the 
damage function is additive, where the marginal damage 
1 Griffin and Bromley do not address two issues: the fact that nonpoint pollution is a stochastic process driven by stochastic variables 
affecting water runoff (such as weather); and the lack of information on nonpoint pollution emissions loads because of the scarce 
knowledge about the pollution transportation and fate processes. 
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for one farmer does not depend on the pollution emis-
sions’ function of the other farmers. The total damage 
is the sum of the individual damages of each farmer.
The social planner’s problem includes the farmers’ 
private benefits and costs, and also the pollution exter-
nalities. This problem depends on the crop type c, the 
irrigation system i, and the soil type s. The social plan-
ner’s problem is thus to:
 Max SP x d r xcis ci is
c i s
 = − ⋅∑ ( ( ) ( ))
, ,
Π  [3]
The first order condition of the maximization prob-
lem is:
 SP x d r xcis ci is' ' ( ) ' ( )= − ⋅ =Π 0  [4]
This condition shows that the marginal private prof-
its of using one additional unit of input must be equal 
to the marginal cost (variable costs and environmental 
damage) of using this input. In the absence of regula-
tion, farmers will produce until their marginal net 
benefits are zero (Eq. [2]). In the social planner’s prob-
lem, the internalization of damages means that mar-
ginal private net benefits must equal marginal dam-
ages (Eq. [4]).
The regulator may introduce a water tax in the farm-
ers’ private problem (Eq. [1]) to force agents to inter-
nalize the external costs. With the tax, the farmers’ 
problem consists in maximizing private benefits less 
the water tax, where tis is the tax rate.
 Max NB x t xcis ci is = − ⋅Π ( )  [5]
The first order condition is equal to:
 NB x tcis ci is' ' ( )= − =Π 0  [6]
When the tax is equal to the marginal damage, the 
first order condition is equivalent to the one obtained 
in the social planner problem (Eq. [4]). The regulator 
could induce farmers to internalize the external costs 
by using a water tax equal to the marginal damage. The 
tax rate obtained is the Pigouvian rate. Equations [4] 
and [6] show that in order to induce efficient decisions, 
the regulator should set the tax rate equal to the value 
of the marginal environmental damage, i.e.:
 t d ris is= ⋅ '  [7]
This analysis shows the first-best policy that can be 
applied to abate nonpoint pollution. Since the type of 
soil determines the quantity of saline substances that 
the farmers emit, the optimal tax rate must be different 
for each farmer. In the context of this work, the prob-
lem of implementing a first-best policy is the diffi-
culty in identifying the type of soil of each farmer, so 
the tax rate can only be differentiated by the irrigation 
technology.
Other difficulties are the existence of transaction and 
administrative costs. Additionally the scarcity of infor-
mation makes difficult to implement an input tax with 
differentiated tax rates for each type of farmer. Usu-
ally, regulators use a uniform tax rate for all agents, 
while trying to minimize the inefficiency. This is a 
second-best policy because the most efficient alterna-
tive would be to implement different tax rates reflecting 
the heterogeneity in pollution between agents, but the 
transaction costs and political hindrances make this 
alternative unfeasible.
The approach of this work is to study the use of a 
second-best policy to reduce pollution in the Ebro 
Basin. In this model regulator can differentiate farmers 
by irrigation technology but not by soil type, so it is no 
possible to achieve the first-best. The objective of the 
study is to analyze a water tax over heterogeneous 
agents, comparing the efficiency of a uniform tax ver-
sus irrigation-based tax (non-uniform). The water tax 
in this model depends on the irrigation technology; a 
more efficient technology a lower tax will be paid.
Study area
The Ebro River is the longest river with the biggest 
hydrographic basin in Spain. It covers 20% of the sur-
face of Spain. The Ebro Basin is located in the north-
east Spain and extends over an area of 85,362 km2, with 
a longitude of 910 km. 
The climate in this area is continental with extreme 
temperatures, very cold winters and very warm sum-
mers. The rainfall is around the national mean with 550 
mm a year, distributed between the seasons of spring 
and autumn. It is important to highlight the frequent 
presence of a wind called “cierzo”, with a high drying 
power, which gives rise to large evapotranspiration, 
accentuating the dryness of the area. It is thus necessary 
to use irrigation to provide supplementary water to the 
rainfall. A total of 780,000 ha in the Ebro Basin are 
dedicated to irrigated agriculture. This is 28% of the 
total cultivated area. The agriculture in this area is 
characterized by a large difference across farmers in 
terms of both crops and irrigation systems.
The salinity in the Ebro Basin is originated from 
geological processes related to the formation of this 
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region. The problem has worsened with irrigation, which 
increases water circulation in soils and generates larger 
exports of salts that further deteriorate the water quality 
of the Ebro River. In this context salinity emissions to 
ecosystems are generated by the leaching of salts from 
the soil. The irrigation water that is used in the Ebro is 
a good quality one, so the problem is not because the 
use of saline water but rather the salinity into the soils.
The salinity in the study area is identified from the study 
“Reconocimiento Territorial de Aragón” from the early 
1980’s. With the information of soils and their electric 
conductivity (ECe), a ranking of soils has been made 
(Table 1 shows the soil typology in the area).
The area of interest in this study is the Flumen Basin 
(sub-basin of the Ebro River Basin). The Flumen River 
flows into Ebro River, and is located in the northeast 
part of the Aragon region. The conversion to intensive 
agriculture in this area has generated the inefficient use 
of irrigation water that generates saline return flows to 
the ecosystems. It is also one of the rivers inside the 
Ebro Basin with the highest salinity levels. The returns 
from the irrigation districts in the Flumen Basin have 
high salinity loads, which come from the geological 
materials that form this area soils.
The Flumen Basin extends over 85,510 ha of the 
Ebro Basin where 54,469 ha are from agriculture. Ir-
rigation agriculture extends approximately over 35,900 
ha. The prevailing irrigation technology is surface or 
flood irrigation (26,500 ha), followed by sprinkler 
(11,300 ha) and drip (900 ha). The main crops planted 
in the Flumen Basin are corn (8,830 ha), alfalfa (9,600 
ha) and barley (9,400 ha). Other important crops 
planted are wheat (2,200 ha), and rice (1,850 ha). In 
this paper we only consider three crops: corn (Zea mays 
L.), alfalfa (Medicago sativa L.) and wheat (Triticum 
aestivum L.). With respect to the salinity, a 34% of the 
soils are non-saline, around a 36% have a moderate 
salinity problem, and a 29% of them have high salin-
ity problems.
Empirical model
This section describes the bio-economic model used 
in the analysis. There are different production and pol-
lution functions for each type of farmer. Production 
functions depend on the type of crop produced (corn, 
wheat or alfalfa),2 irrigation system (flood or sprinkler), 
and type of soil (saline, moderate saline or non saline). 
The pollution functions also depend on the type of soil 
and the irrigation technology. So, each farmer is dif-
ferent depending on his/her farm characteristics: type 
of crop, type of soil, and irrigation system.
Agricultural production generates a negative exter-
nality in the Flumen Basin through water percolation 
in the soil that brings salinity loads to river courses. 
This salinity affects the aquatic ecosystems and water 
users downstream. When farmers do not take into ac-
count the harmful effect that they are causing the farm-
ers’ private profit is:
 Πci ci ci xi c cp y p x k s= ⋅ − ⋅ − +  [8]
where yci = fci(x), in this model farmers produce a crop 
yci, with only one productive input that is the irrigation 
water use x, which also is the contaminant input. The 
crop and input market prices3 are respectively pc, px, 
and kc and sc are the fixed cost of production and sub-
sidies that different crops receive4, the fix costs and the 
subsidies are crop specific. 
Farmers only consider their private benefit, but not 
the social damage, D(ris), from pollution leaching ris(x). 
To correct the external damage the regulator imple-
2 The crops chosen are alfalfa, corn and wheat; these are some of the most important crops in the study area, and additionally, there 
were available estimations of the production functions (Uku, 2003).
3 Farmers are price-takers.
4 This private profit (pci) is the quasi-rent, which is the difference between the production activity revenues and subsidies less the 
production costs as input costs, salaries, etc.
Table 1. Soil typology by saline level
Soil type Electrical conductivity, ECe(dS m–1)
Soil depth ps
(cm)
Saline soil > 8 120-80
Moderate saline soil 2-6  80-60
Non-saline soil < 2  60-40
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ments a water tax. With the tax the restricted private 
benefit (ptcis) of farmers becomes: 
 Πcist c ci c x c isp y s p x k t x= ⋅ + − ⋅ − − ⋅  [9]
where tis is the tax rate that depends on the irrigation 
technology (i) and the soil type (s). 
The introduction of the tax rate to internalize the 
social damage causes that the restricted private benefit 
depends on the type of soil too. The regulator chooses 
the optimal tax rate, the set of values of tax rates that 
are equal to the marginal damage that each farmer is 
generating. As the marginal damage is different by each 
farmer the tax rates too. Social welfare SWcis(x) is given 
by the expression:
 SW x t xcis ci
t
is
c i s
( ) ( )
, ,
= + ⋅∑ Π  [10]
Social welfare is the restricted private benefit func-
tion plus the tax that society receives. This tax goes 
directly to the society as compensation for the emis-
sions that agents generate.
The production functions take a quadratic polyno-
mial specification. This specification is common in the 
literature due to its properties of substitution between 
inputs, maximum level of production, and no conver-
gence problems in estimation. 
 f x x xci ci ci ci( ) = + ⋅ + ⋅α β δ 2  [11]
where aci, bci, and dci are the production function pa-
rameters that depend on the type of crop and the irriga-
tion system of each farmer. 
The parameters of production functions have been 
calculated from the estimations of Uku (2003). In his 
work, Uku calculate the data to estimate different pro-
duction functions, among them for wheat, corn, and 
alfalfa, with the EPIC (Environment Policy Integrated 
Climate) crop growth simulation package. EPIC simu-
lates the relationship between the crop growth and 
variables as soil, weather, water use, and crop manage-
ment. The EPIC model has been calibrated to represent 
the crop production functions in the study area. The 
results of the model have been tested with two systems 
surveys distributed to farmers in the Ebro basin and 
checking the result with field experiments. Table 2 
shows the parameters of the production functions for 
corn, alfalfa and wheat under different irrigation sys-
tems (flood and sprinkler).
The pollution functions ris(x) relate saline emission 
loads with input irrigation water. The specification is 
linear, and is given by the expression:
 r x xis is is( ) = + ⋅γ η  [12]
where the parameters of this equation gci and hci depend 
on the irrigation system and in the type of soil of each 
farmer. So, salinity loads depend on the soil salt con-
tents and the water leaching from crop cultivation. 
Accordingly, different pollution functions have been 
defined for each combination of soil type (saline, mod-
erate, and no saline) and irrigation system (flood and 
sprinkler). A total of six different functions have been 
calculated. Table 3 shows the values of the coefficients 
for the emissions functions.
The data to estimate the salinity pollution functions 
are obtained using the Hoffman (1986) formula, 
modified by Quílez (1998). The equation from Quílez 
relates the initial salinity in the soil with the final 
salinity when there is a leaching process from perco-
lation: 
 
CE
CE
cl
pr
ps
cl0
=
+




 [13]
Table 2. Production functions by crop and irrigation technology
Coefficient Corn Alfalfa Wheat
Flood
aci –5.64 –2.36 –1.42
bci 3.06 ? 10–3 2.90 ? 10–3 3.02 ? 10–3
dci –1.42 ? 10–7 –1.29 ? 10–7 –3.20 ? 10–7
Adjusted R2 0.92 0.93 0.89
Sprinkler
ac –8.00 –0.52 1.90
bci 5.14 ? 10–3 4.09 ? 10–3 2.73 ? 10–3
dci –3.03 ? 10–7 –2.56 ? 10–7 –3.57 ? 10–7
Adjusted R2 0.97 0.97 0.81
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5 This value is obtained dividing the approximate cost of the technological change (~ € 6,000 ha–1) by the life expectancy or the 
service life of the technology that is ~ 15 years.
Table 3. Pollution functions parameters by soil type and irrigation technology
Coefficients
Saline Moderate saline Non saline
Flood Sprinkler Flood Sprinkler Flood Sprinkler
gis –2,260.1 –1,551.4 –1,231.7 –780.9 –471.1 –281.8
his 1.797 1.017 0.827 0.449 0.286 0.150
Adjusted R2 0.997 0.998 0.995 0.997 0.999 0.995
where CE is the soil final salt concentration, CE0 is the 
initial soil salt concentration, cl is the leaching fraction, 
pr is the percolation, and finally ps is soil depth.
 
CE CE CE CE
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 [14]
This equation leads to the expression:
s CE CE
cl
ef x
ps
cl
= ⋅
− ⋅
+














( )1


⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅
−640 10 16 [( ) ]ef x  [15]
where salinity emissions s depend on the irrigation 
water used (x), this function also includes the effect of 
the irrigation system in the coefficient ef that is the 
irrigation system technology efficiency. The irrigation 
technology generates different levels of percolation, 
since the irrigation efficiency is 0.55 for flood and 0.75 
for sprinkle. Eq. [14] was adapted by Mema (2006), 
from the Quílez one, to obtain values for salinity leach-
ing in tons per cubic meter of water. This equation has 
been used to generate the data of salinity emissions s 
for quantity of irrigation water x. 
Different heterogeneous farms are defined by com-
bining the type of crop, irrigation technology, and soil 
characteristics. For each crop the production function 
is concave and the salinity pollution function is linear, 
and both functions only depend on the irrigation water 
input in a deterministic manner. The negative external-
ity generated by the production activities of farmers 
affects the environment but it has no direct impacts on 
the other farmers. The private farmer’s problem is 
expressed as:
 Max x p x x p x kcis ci ci ci ci xi c Π ( ) = + ⋅ + ⋅( ) − ⋅ − +α β δ 2 sc 
 Max x p x x p x kcis ci ci ci ci xi c Π ( ) = + ⋅ + ⋅( ) − ⋅ − +α β δ 2 sc  [16]
The fix costs and the subsidies differ for each crop 
type like the crops’ market prices. Farmers are rational 
and there is not cooperation between them. Table 4 
shows the values of prices, subsidies, and fixes costs. 
In the case of the fix costs, farmers with sprinkler have 
an additional cost that is the capital amortization. To 
change the irrigation technology farmers need to invest 
an important quantity of capital. The change in the 
technology supposes a cost about € 6,000 to 7,000 ha–1 
by farmer (Uku, 2003). This investment is amortized 
in a period of 15 years that is the approximated time 
of duration of the irrigation technology (life of the 
technology). The amortization of the technology sup-
poses an annually increase in the fix costs by farmers 
with sprinkler in5 ~ € 500 ha–1. This price internalizes 
the amortization costs of the technology, and the in-
crease in costs like the energy or the maintenance of 
the technology.
The difference between the social planner’s problem 
and the private maximization problem is the negative 
externality. In the social planner’s problem the regula-
tor implements a water tax and the problem becomes:
 Max x p x x p x kcist ci ci ci ci xi c Π ( ) = + ⋅ + ⋅( ) − ⋅ −α β δ 2 + − ⋅s t xc is 
 Max x p x x p x kcist ci ci ci ci xi c Π ( ) = + ⋅ + ⋅( ) − ⋅ −α β δ 2 + − ⋅s t xc is  [17]
The difference between equations [16] and [17] is 
the last term tis ? x, which is the water tax. The tax rate 
is different for each farmer since it is taxing the damage 
that each farmer generates.
The regulator can calculate the different tax rates by 
using the optimal quantity of emissions. The value of 
the environmental damage from salinity pollution is 
not known, but this value has been approximated by 
calculating the costs of extracting the salts from the 
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water. CIRCE (Centro de Investigación de Recursos y 
Consumos Energéticos, Zaragoza, Spain) estimates that 
the value of clean water that can be used for human 
consumption is6 ~ € 0.036 kg–1. This value is the price 
of the emission, or the economic value of the damage, 
that farmers cause to the ecosystems. In this model, it 
is the value of d.
Using information about the profit functions and the 
cost of cleaning salinity from water bodies, the social 
planner can calculate the optimal quantity of emissions 
and output. The social planner uses this quantity of emis-
sions to calculate the optimal tax rate for each farmer.
Table 5 collects the values of the different taxes. 
These taxes are the rates that must be applied to farm-
ers in order to obtain a socially optimal level of emis-
sions. There are a total of six different tax rates.
The implementation of an instrument with six dif-
ferent tax rates is infeasible because the information 
problem in identifying each farmer with its soil type7. 
However, it is relatively easy for a government to know 
the irrigation technology that each farmer is using. So, 
a tax rate differentiated by irrigation technology can 
be implemented. The regulator identifies each farmer 
with its irrigation technologies and s/he applies differ-
ent tax rates. The tax rates chosen are the optimal ones 
by moderately saline soils (with flood and sprinkler). 
The water tax rates are ts 5 € 0.016 m–3 and ts 5 € 0.030 
m–3, where ts 5 taxes farmers using sprinkler and 
tf 5 taxes farmers using flood (see Table 5).
Results and discussion 
Three different scenarios were analyzed: i) baseline 
scenario (or non regulation), where farmers do not take 
into account the environmental costs of their activity; 
ii) first best, where six different tax rates are imple-
mented so farmers pay the total damage of their activ-
ity; iii) irrigation-based water tax, where two tax rates 
by irrigation technology are implemented.8
The results of the model have been calculated using 
the program GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling 
System, GAMS Dev. Co.) designed for modeling op-
timization problems. For each scenario there are results 
of social welfare, farmer’s profits, water use, emissions 
and tax payment. As simplification, we assumed that 
farmers are cultivating one hectare of land, therefore, 
all the results are per hectare. 
Table 6 presents the results of the baseline scenario, 
when no regulation is implemented and farmers maxi-
mize their private profits without considering the pol-
lution costs. The results of this scenario show that the 
crop with the highest productivity was alfalfa, followed 
by corn and wheat. The highest private profits were 
6 This value is estimated by CIRCE. The cost of desalinization is € 0.030 m–3 and the runoff of salt is 1.2 kg m–3 then the extraction 
costs of salts are € 0.036 kg–1.
7 Furthermore, farmers can have more than one soil type.
8 The tax rates are the optimal in the case of moderate saline soils for both irrigation technologies.
Table 4. Values of economic parameters
Parameters Corn Alfalfa Wheat
px (€ m–3) 0.03 0.03 0.03
py (€ t–1) 193 115 223
k (€ ha–1) 1,259 733 930
s (€ ha–1) 100 10 60
Source: MARM (2008).
Table 5. Water tax rates by soil type and irrigation technology
Flood irrigation system Sprinkler irrigation system
Saline soil 0.065 0.037
Moderately saline soil 0.030 0.016
Nonsaline soil 0.010 0.005
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with corn followed by alfalfa and wheat. These results 
stay independent of the type of irrigation technology. 
Sprinkler technology was more efficient in the produc-
tion of all crops than flood. The decrease in the emis-
sions between flood to sprinkler was around 60% for 
all crops. The most contaminant crop was corn fol-
lowed by alfalfa and wheat. The difference in the emis-
sion levels between irrigation technologies generated 
a greater reduction in the social welfare between saline, 
moderate, and non-saline soils9. 
Table 7 shows the simulations under the first-best 
scenario. Farmers internalize the total damages of their 
activity.10 Comparing this scenario with the previous 
one it is possible to observe an increase in the social 
Table 6. Farmers results by irrigation technology, soil and crop type under the baseline scenario 
where no regulation exists
Saline Moderate Non saline
Corn Flood
Welfare (€ ha–1) 403.0 723.0 894.7
Private profits (€ ha–1) 983.1 983.1 983.1
Water use (m3) 10,227 10,227 10,227
Crop yield (t) 10.80 10.80 10.80
Emissions (t) 16.11 7.22 2.46
Corn Sprinkler
Welfare (€ ha–1) 661.6 797.3 865.3
Private profits (€ ha–1) 898.3 898.3 898.3
Water use (m3) 7,994 7,994 7,994
Crop yield (t) 12.61 12.61 12.61
Emissions (t) 6.58 2.81 0.80
Alfalfa Flood
Welfare (€ ha–1) 201.8 521.2 692.5
Private profits (€ ha–1) 780.7 780.7 780.7
Water use (m3) 10,208 10,208 10,208
Crop yield (t) 13.8 13.8 13.8
Emissions (t) 16.08 7.21 2.45
Alfalfa Sprinkler
Welfare (€ ha–1) 865.5 597.5 660.0
Private profits (€ ha–1) 690.4 690.4 690.4
Water use (m3) 7,488 7,488 7,488
Crop yield (t) 15.7 15.7 15.7
Emissions (t) 6.06 2.58 0.84
Wheat Flood
Welfare (€ ha–1) 261.2 381.8 442.2
Private profits (€ ha–1) 471.8 471.8 471.8
Water use (m3) 4,513 4,513 4,513
Crop yield (t) 5.71 5.71 5.71
Emissions (t) 5.85 2.50 0.82
Wheat Sprinkler
Welfare (€ ha–1) 331.1 377.7 398.8
Private profits (€ ha–1) 408.4 408.4 408.4
Water use (m3) 3,617 3,617 3,617
Crop yield (t) 7.12 7.12 7.12
Emissions (t) 2.15 0.84 0.26
9 In the case of farmers with non saline soil the social welfare is higher with flood than with sprinkler, this is because the large 
investment to change technology (decrease in private profits) and the low emission level under this soil type. 
10 Social planner implements the six different tax rates, so the emissions of all farmers are the optimal ones.
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welfare by all crops and irrigation technologies. The 
increase in social welfare was higher by farmers with 
flood than farmers with sprinkler. With flood the social 
welfare increased a 50% in saline soils, a 20% in mod-
erate saline soils, and a 10% in non-saline soil. With 
sprinkler the increase in welfare in saline soils was a 
20%, 10% in moderate saline soils, and 5% in non-
saline soils11. Crop yields decrease by all farmers due 
to the internalization of the social costs and the de-
crease in the production. Like in the previous scenario, 
the most productive crop was alfalfa and the lowest, 
wheat. Private profits were lower by all farmers in the 
first-best scenario because farmers took into account 
the social cost of their emissions. Unlike the scenario 
without regulation in the first best the private profits of 
farmers with sprinkler were higher than the private 
profits with flood. This effect is consequence to the 
difference in the emissions costs, farmers with flood 
11 These percentages are similar to all crops studied in the work.
Table 7. Results by irrigation technology and soil type under the first-best scenario
Saline soil Moderate saline soil Non-saline soil
Corn Flood
Welfare (€ ha–1) 944.7 974.8 982.2
Private profits (€ ha–1) 356.7 684.3 881.7
Water use (m3) 9,047 9,684 10,039
Crop yield (t) 10.42 10.68 10.77
Emissions (t) 13.99 6.77 2.40
Corn Sprinkler
Welfare (€ ha–1) 838.9 897.2 898.2
Private profits (€ ha–1) 608.5 771.5 858,4
Water use (m3) 7,681 7,856 7,948
Crop yield (t) 12.53 12.58 12.60
Emissions (t) 6.26 2.74 0.91
Alfalfa Flood
Welfare (€ ha–1) 710.5 765.8 778.9
Private profits (€ ha–1) 188.0 489.5 680.3
Water use (m3) 8,038 9,210 9,863
Crop yield (t) 12.62 13.41 13.69
Emissions (t) 12.18 6.38 2.35
Alfalfa Sprinkler
Welfare (€ ha–1) 978.7 988.2 990.1
Private profits (€ ha–1) 724.9 872.7 953.2
Water use (m3) 6,859 7,216 7,403
Crop yield (t) 15.52 15.69 15.76
Emissions (t) 5.42 2.46 0.83
Wheat Flood
Welfare (€ ha–1) 456.9 468.7 471.4
Private profits (€ ha–1) 193.3 339.7 427.0
Water use (m3) 4,054 4,302 4,440
Crop yield (t) 5.59 5.67 5.70
Emissions (t) 5.02 2.33 0.80
Wheat Sprinkler
Welfare (€ ha–1) 304.1 307.5 308.3
Private profits (€ ha–1) 178.0 251.1 290.2
Water use (m3) 3,407 3,537 3,605
Crop yield (t) 7.07 7.11 7.12
Emissions (t) 1.91 0.81 0.26
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generate higher emissions and need to pay higher taxes. 
The reduction in private profits was greater for farmers 
with flood than with sprinkler. The higher reduction in 
private profits was for farmers with saline soils. 
The irrigation system allows farmers to produce more 
efficiently the same quantity of output with less quan-
tity of input. With the sprinkler technology the leaching 
of saline materials to the ecosystem decreased by a 
significant proportion. Another important reason to use 
sprinkler technology is water scarcity problems; farm-
ers can be more efficient in the use of water when they 
use a more efficient technology, in this case sprinkler.12
Table 8 shows the results under the irrigation-based 
water tax scenario. Two different tax rates were imple-
mented by irrigation technology. The values of the tax 
rates chosen were the optimal values for both irrigation 
systems when farmers had a moderate saline soil. The 
decision to choose these rates was because it is the 
intermediate value between a high value, the one for 
saline soil, and a low value, the one for non-saline soil. 
Farmers with flood were taxed with a rate of 0.030, and 
farmers with sprinkler were taxed with a rate of 0.016.
The results show that the implementation of an irri-
gation-based water tax improved the social welfare in 
all soil types comparing with the baseline scenario. 
Farmers with moderate saline soil achieved the optimal 
social welfare because the tax rate used was the optimal 
by this type of soil. The social welfare by farmers with 
saline and non-saline soils was lower than in the first 
best due to the tax was not the optimal. Tax rates cho-
sen were higher for non-saline soils and lower for sa-
line soils.Private profits decreased with respect the 
baseline scenario because the tax pushed farmers to 
consider the pollution costs. With respect to the first-
best scenario, the profits of the farmers who had saline 
soils were higher; this is because these farmers are not 
internalizing all the damage that their activity is caus-
ing. In the case of farmers with moderate saline soil 
the profits were equal to the optimal; the tax rate was 
the optimal for them. In the case of farmers with non-
saline soils the profits were lower because they paid a 
higher tax than the optimal. 
Comparing the results of the irrigation-base water 
tax instrument with the results of the first-best (Table 7) 
it is possible to observe how the social welfare de-
creased by all farmers (by farmers with moderate saline 
soil the social welfare was the same). Social planner 
implements a second-best policy due to there is no 
enough information to identify the soil type of each 
farmer. Social planner cannot implement the six opti-
mal tax rates, but at least can introduce some extra 
information like the irrigation technology.
One of the most important results of this work is the 
comparison between the use of a uniform water tax rate 
and a non-uniform one. When there are heterogeneous 
agents, social welfare improves when the social planner 
could differentiate the tax instead of using a unique tax 
rate. Shortle et al. (1998) showed in their work that 
using non-uniform tax rates can be more cost-efficient 
in pollution control because it is possible to deal differ-
ent polluters with different characteristics and different 
level of emissions. When farmers are heterogeneous 
using a uniform tax rate generates inefficiencies because 
each farmer pollutes differently. With a uniform tax all 
farmers reduce the same amount of emissions. In a 
heterogeneous world, when taxes are non-uniform, 
farmers do not reduce the same amount of emissions 
but rather reduce them proportionally.
The problem of implementing non-uniform tax rates 
is an information one. It is complicated for the social 
planner to have enough information to identify the 
types of agents and their particular levels of emis-
sions, especially with nonpoint pollution. Neverthe-
less, there are situations in which the social planner 
can easily obtain information about farmer types. S/
he can identify the farmers’ irrigation technologies 
and implement a water tax based on this difference.13 
As Table 8 shows the implementation of an optimal 
tax requires the use of six different rates. To imple-
ment six different tax rates is practically unfeasible, 
however the use of two, determined by each irrigation 
technology, is not.
Table 9 shows the comparison between a water tax 
with uniform tax rate, and an irrigation-based water 
tax. This table compares the social welfare, quantity of 
emissions, and private profits between these two alter-
natives. The tax rate chosen to simulate the scenario in 
which the social planner uses a uniform tax rate was 
12 It is assumed that farmers do not increase the number of hectares or change to a more productive and water intensive crop. Under 
this assumption a technological change from flood to sprinkler reduces the water use.
13 In the Spanish case, there are river basin authorities that have information on the type of irrigation system of each farmer. So, 
the social planner can obtain the necessary information to implement a non-uniform tax rate based on that difference.
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the optimal value for sprinkler in a moderate saline soil 
(0.016).14
The results of this comparison highlight the increase 
in the efficiency between a uniform water tax instru-
ment and an irrigation-based water tax. But this in-
crease in the efficiency in the case of this study was 
relatively small. So assuming positive transaction costs 
it will be justified the use of a uniform tax rate instead 
Table 8. Irrigation-based water tax instrument (two tax rates)
Saline soil Moderate saline soil Non-saline soil
Corn Flood
Welfare (€ ha–1) 933.8 974.9 971.2
Private profits (€ ha–1) 684.5 684.5 684.5
Water use (m3) 9,680 9,680 9,680
Crop yield (t) 10.68 10.68 10.68
Emissions (t) 15.13 6.77 2.30
Tax payment (€ ha–1) 290.4 290.4 290.4
Corn Sprinkler
Welfare (€ ha–1) 890.9 897.2 896.8
Private profits (€ ha–1) 771.5 771.5 771.5
Water use (m3) 7,857 7,857 7,857
Crop yield (t) 12.58 12.58 12.58
Emissions (t) 6.44 2.74 0.90
Tax payment (€ ha–1) 125.7 125.7 125.7
Alfalfa Flood
Welfare (€ ha–1) 690.3 765.6 758.9
Private profits (€ ha–1) 489.6 489.6 489.6
Water use (m3) 9,202 9,202 9,202
Crop yield (t) 13.41 13.41 13.41
Emissions (t) 14.27 6.380 2.16
Tax payment (€ ha–1) 276.1 276.1 276.1
Alfalfa Sprinkler
Welfare (€ ha–1) 960.7 988.2 987.2
Private profits (€ ha–1) 872.7 872.7 872.7
Water use (m3) 7,216 7,216 7,216
Crop yield (t) 15.69 15.69 15.69
Emissions (t) 5.785 2.46 0.80
Tax payment (€ ha–1) 115.4 115.4 115.4
Wheat Flood
Welfare (€ ha–1) 452.5 468.6 467.1
Private profits (€ ha–1) 339.5 339.5 339.5
Water use (m3) 4,300 4,300 4,300
Crop yield (t) 5.67 5.67 5.67
Emissions (t) 5.47 2.33 0.76
Tax payment (€ ha–1) 129.0 129.0 129.0
Wheat Sprinkler
Welfare (€ ha–1) 302.7 307.5 307.2
Private profits (€ ha–1) 250.9 250.9 250.9
Water use (m3) 3,537 3,537 3,537
Crop yield (t) 7.11 7.11 7.11
Emissions (t) 2.04 0.81 0.25
Tax payment (€ ha–1) 56.6 56.6 56.6
14 Results are similar for any uniform rate.
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15 This incentive appears in the case of farmers with corn and alfalfa, in the case of wheat there are not incentives by farmers 
switching their irrigation technology. In the case of corn and alfalfa the private profits are higher with sprinkler than with flood, so 
the tax creates an incentive to change the irrigation technology to a more efficient one. 
Table 9. Comparison between uniform water tax and irrigation-based water tax
Uniform water tax instrument Irrigation-based water tax instrument
Saline Moderate Non-saline Saline Moderate Non-saline
Corn Flood
Welfare (€ ha–1) 923.2 973.1 979.7 933.8 974.9 971.2
Private profits (€ ha–1) 821.8 821.8 821.8 684.5 684.5 684.5
Emissions (t) 15.60 6.98 2.37 15.13 6.77 2.30
Corn Sprinkler
Welfare (€ ha–1) 890.9 897.2 896.8 890.9 897.2 896.8
Private profits (€ ha–1) 771.5 771.5 771.5 771.5 771.5 771.5
Emissions (t) 6.44 2.74 0.89 6.44 2.74 0.90
Alfalfa Flood
Welfare (€ ha–1) 670.7 762.6 774.5 690.3 765.6 758.9
Private profits (€ ha–1) 621.7 621.7 621.7 489.6 489.6 489.6
Emissions (t) 15.12 6.76 2.30 14.27 6.38 2.16
Alfalfa Sprinkler
Welfare (€ ha–1) 960.7 988.2 987.2 960.7 988.2 987.2
Private profits (€ ha–1) 872.7 872.7 872.7 872.7 872.7 872.7
Emissions (t) 5.78 2.46 0.80 5.78 2.46 0.80
Wheat Flood
Welfare (€ ha–1) 449.1 468.1 470.4 452.5 468.6 467.1
Private profits (€ ha–1) 400.4 400.4 400.4 339.5 339.5 339.5
Emissions (t) 5.64 2.40 0.79 5.47 2.33 0.76
Wheat Sprinkler
Welfare (€ ha–1) 302.7 307.5 307.2 302.7 307.5 307.2
Private profits (€ ha–1) 250.9 250.9 250.9 250.9 250.9 250.9
Emissions (t) 2.04 0.81 0.25 2.04 0.81 0.25
of a two taxes instrument. The establishment of an ir-
rigation-based instrument in the context of this work 
tries to obtain two results, the control of salinity leach-
ing and the incentive for a technological change. An 
irrigation-based instrument is preferred to a uniform 
policy because it increases the social welfare and gen-
erates incentives for farmers changing their irrigation 
technology.15
Conclusions
This study follows the approach of Griffin and Brom-
ley (1982) to control the pollution problem of salinity 
leaching in the Ebro Basin (Spain). The soils in the area 
have different salinity levels, and farmers use several 
irrigation technologies, so each farmer emits a different 
level of salinity to the basin. The purpose of the work 
is to ascertain the efficiency of using a water tax instru-
ment to abate pollution. A water tax instrument is eas-
ier to apply by the social planner because it does require 
much less information than other policy instruments 
such as ambient-based instruments.
The work explores the efficiency of using a non-
uniform, second-best water tax instrument instead of 
a uniform tax. The social planner has enough informa-
tion about the type of irrigation technology that each 
farmer is using, and can implement larger penalizations 
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to farmers using more polluting technologies. This 
analysis shows how a water tax with two differentiated 
tax rates by irrigation technology, is an efficient instru-
ment to control salinity leaching. With this kind of 
instrument farmers will pay a lower tax whenever their 
technology would be more efficient. Moreover, a non-
uniform tax that differences farmers according their 
irrigation technology is an incentive to change towards 
a cleaner technology (sprinkler irrigation).
An important benefit of this instrument under the 
study area climate conditions is that it helps the social 
planner to control water scarcity. In the Ebro Basin, 
one important problem is the scarcity of water re-
sources. The effect of the water tax is a reduction in 
the quantity of water that farmers use as consequence 
of the increase in the price. Therefore, a tax on irriga-
tion water achieves the objective of reducing the emis-
sion level but also allowing a more efficient use of 
water, therefore preserving the resource. A higher water 
price also internalizes the scarcity problem of resource, 
generating a more efficient use of water.
It is important to take into account that an irriga-
tion-based water tax policy must be applied when-
ever the transaction costs are low enough. Problems 
of farmers’ heterogeneity, number of farmers, and 
technological differences can make costly the imple-
mentation of a nonpoint pollution policy. The imple-
mentation of an irrigation-based tax rate is associated 
with higher transaction costs than a uniform tax rate. 
Therefore, if the transaction costs of implementing 
two tax rates are high it will be more cost-efficient to 
use a unique tax rate. In the context of this work, 
transaction costs are expected to be low due to the 
abundant information regarding farmers’ irrigation 
technologies.
This study shows that an irrigation-based water tax 
can be an efficient instrument in the control of nonpoint 
pollution. This result is conditioned to the model pre-
sented in this work, where the emissions function is a 
lineal one with only one productive input. 
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